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In re Guardianship of Jones, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 6 (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2022)1
GUARDIANSHIP LAW: APPROPRIATENESS OF ATTORNEY FEES PAID FROM THE
PROTECTED PERSON’S ESTATE UNDER NRS. 159.344
Summary
This case is about whether the district court properly granted attorney fees to guardians
from the estate of the protected person under NRS 159.344.2 Donna and Robyn, daughters of the
appellant and protected person, Jones, acted as her temporary guardians for a period in 2019 before
their sister Kimberly was appointed general guardian. The dispute involves the attorney fees
accumulated during Donna and Robyn’s guardianship period.
Jones first argued that the award itself was improper due to the presumption against such
fees payable from the protected person’s estate. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees because it properly considered
the relevant NRS 159.3443 factors, and determined that the fees were just, reasonable, and
necessary. Jones next argued that the amount awarded was excessive due to the guardianship’s
short duration. The Court again rejected Jones’s argument, holding that the district court acted
reasonably, given the complexity of the work involved, as complexity was the proper factor, not
duration. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Background
Kimberly was appointed power of attorney by Jones years before Jones began experiencing
dementia. After the onset of dementia, Jones required full-time care, and her husband Yeoman
acted as caretaker for a time. However, after the onset of his own health issues, Yeoman relocated
to Arizona, and Kimberly moved in with Jones to become her new caretaker. Tensions soon arose
between Yeoman’s side of the family and Kimberly. Yeoman relocated Jones to Arizona against
Kimberly’s wishes, Yeoman’s daughter Candice began eviction proceedings against Kimberly and
Jones (who were living in a property Jones quitclaimed to Candice for below market value after
the onset of Jones’s dementia symptoms), Yeoman directed money to be withdrawn from Jones’s
account, and even Jones’s dogs were taken away from Jones. Despite her status as power of
attorney, Kimberly was unable to prevent or stop these conflicts.
Due to these ongoing disputes, Donna and Robyn sought help from counsel, and after
extensive investigation and negotiation, filed two guardianship petitions. They were granted
temporary guardianship. Kimberly filed a competing petition for general guardianship, and her
petition was granted after the district court determined she had not misused Jones’s funds. Donna
and Robyn were thereafter discharged, and they petitioned for attorney fees, to be covered by
Jones’s estate. The district court granted attorney fees, and Jones now appeals.
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Discussion
Jones’s first argument is that NRS 159.3444 requires a guardian to confer a benefit upon
the protected person before the protected person’s estate is required to pay the guardian’s attorney
fees, and Donna and Robyn did not confer a benefit. As an initial matter, the Court noted that the
statutory language does not contain such strict requirements. Additionally, Jones’s argument fails
because the district court’s finding that Jones benefitted from Donna and Robyn’s temporary
guardianship was not an abuse of discretion.
Although NRS 159.3445 presumes that guardians are personally liable for their own
attorney fees, the court has discretion to award fees if the guardian so petitions and it finds that the
fees are “just, reasonable, and necessary.” In making this finding, the district court may consider
“(1) whether the guardian’s attorney conferred a benefit on the protected person (2) the character
of the work performed, including its difficulty; (3) the result of the work; and (4) any other factor
that may be considered relevant.”6 Here, the district court reasonably determined, after a
consideration of the factors, that given the inter-family dispute and circumstances surrounding the
sale of Jones’s home and her finances, Jones benefited from Donna and Robyn’s guardianship
work.
Jones’s second argument is that the district court’s award of attorney fees were improper
in amount, given the short time that Donna and Robyn were guardians. The Court rejected this
argument for much of the same reasons. Additionally, the Court emphasized that duration is not a
factor enumerated in NRS 159.3447 nor provided in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank.8
Rather, it is the complexity of the case that is a factor in determining the proper fee amount. Not
only did some motions in the district court attract four filings from four different parties, Donna
and Robyn reasonably asked their attorney to work on power of attorney matters. Thus, given the
scope of work and its complexity, the fee amount was proper.
Jones’s final argument was rejected by the Court for noncompliance with NEV. R. APP.
PRO. 28, citing Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Restaurant.9
Conclusion
The district court properly applied the relevant NRS 159.34410 factors and did not abuse
its discretion in finding that the attorney fees accumulated during Donna and Robyn’s temporary
guardianship warranted compensation from Jones’s estate as they were just, reasonable, and
necessary. For the same reasons, and considering Brunzell, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in setting the amount of the award, given the complex and time-consuming nature of the
issue. The Court therefore affirmed.
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Citing NEV. REV. STAT § 159.344 (5)(b), (d), (f), (n) (2021).
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NEV. REV. STAT § 159.344 (2021).
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85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969); O’Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 550, 555, 429 P.3d 664,
668 (Ct. App. 2018) (“When considering the amount of attorney fees to award, the analysis turns on the factors set
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